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Abstract
Recent research on mental representation of complex action has revealed distinct differences in the structure of
representational frameworks between experts and novices. More recently, research on the development of mental
representation structure has elicited functional changes in novices’ representations as a result of practice. However, research
investigating if and how mental practice adds to this adaptation process is lacking. In the present study, we examined the
influence of mental practice (i.e., motor imagery rehearsal) on both putting performance and the development of one’s
representation of the golf putt during early skill acquisition. Novice golfers (N= 52) practiced the task of golf putting under
one of four different practice conditions: mental, physical, mental-physical combined, and no practice. Participants were
tested prior to and after a practice phase, as well as after a three day retention interval. Mental representation structures of
the putt were measured, using the structural dimensional analysis of mental representation. This method provides
psychometric data on the distances and groupings of basic action concepts in long-term memory. Additionally, putting
accuracy and putting consistency were measured using two-dimensional error scores of each putt. Findings revealed
significant performance improvements over the course of practice together with functional adaptations in mental
representation structure. Interestingly, after three days of practice, the mental representations of participants who
incorporated mental practice into their practice regime displayed representation structures that were more similar to a
functional structure than did participants who did not incorporate mental practice. The findings of the present study
suggest that mental practice promotes the cognitive adaptation process during motor learning, leading to more elaborate
representations than physical practice only.
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Introduction
According to skill acquisition theories, cognitive mechanisms
governing skill execution develop over the course of learning [1–
5]. To this extent, skill acquisition is known to be accompanied by
both overt changes (i.e., performance improvements) and covert
changes (i.e., cognitive improvements) over time. Of particular
interest for skill acquisition is the role that mental representations
play in the learning and control of actions. Individuals of different
skill levels have been suggested to differ not only in their overt
performance [6], but also in their underlying skill representations
in long-term memory [7–11]. Consequently, an individual’s
mental representation of a motor skill is thought to change on
his/her way to expertise, namely in the direction of an elaborate,
well-developed representation [12].
Knowledge-based mental representation structures in long-term
memory have been measured using a variety of different methods
[13]. One approach, which specifically takes into account the
cognitive level of motor actions, is the cognitive action architecture
approach (CAA-A) [14–16]. According to this approach, motor
learning can be characterized as the modification and adaptation
of representational frameworks of complex actions in memory.
Representational frameworks are comprised of basic action
concepts (BACs; i.e., cognitive chunks of movement postures
and their sensory consequences within the realization of an action
goal), which reflect the building blocks of an action in long-term
memory.
Early research on representational frameworks of complex
action has elicited distinct differences in the mental representation
between experts and novices. Schack and Mechsner [15], for
example, investigated representational frameworks of the tennis
serve in expert and non-expert tennis players using structural
dimensional analysis of mental representation (SDA-M) [14,17].
Findings revealed distinct differences between the mental repre-
sentation of expert and novice tennis players such that experts’
structures were more elaborate than novices’ structures. More
specifically, whereas the mental representations of experts were
organized hierarchically and structured in a functional way (i.e.,
BACs being grouped according to the functional and biomechan-
ical demands of the tennis serve), the mental representations of
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novices were not. Moreover, novices’ mental representations
varied greatly in their structure, while those of experts were more
similar. From this, the authors concluded that such elaborate skill
representations in long-term memory play a salient role in skilled
action. Up to now, distinct differences in representational
frameworks of complex action have been demonstrated across a
variety of sports, such as dance [18], volleyball [19], and
windsurfing [20]. Furthermore, the results have been shown to
generalize to developmental aspects of manual action [21], and to
special populations [22].
More recently, Frank, Land, and Schack [23] examined if and
how representational frameworks of complex action change over
the course of practice in early skill acquisition. Specifically, a group
of novices practiced a putting task over the course of three days,
whereas a control group did not putt at all. Mental representation
structures were recorded prior to and after practice as well as after
a three-day retention interval. Results indicated that neither of the
groups’ mental representations revealed any meaningful structure
of the putt prior to practice. However, along with performance
improvements, changes in the mental representation structure
were evident for the practice group. Specifically, after substantial
putting practice, the mental representation of the practice group
revealed a structure that reflected key parts of the movement phase
pertaining to the functional and biomechanical demands of the
task. For the control group, however, no changes in mental
representation of the putt were evident from pre-, to post- and to
retention-test. From this, it was concluded that the acquisition of
motor skills is associated with functional adaptations of the
representational frameworks in long-term memory. In addition to
the research showing the changes in mental representation over
the course of skill acquisition, more recently, Land, Frank, &
Schack [24] demonstrated that the type of instructions given to
novices during learning (here: internal vs. external focus) can
influence the rate of representation development. Results indicated
that learners instructed to adopt an external focus of attention
performed with greater putting accuracy and consistency, while
also revealing a greater degree of development in their mental
representation of the putting task.
Interestingly, while instructional type has been shown to
influence the development of mental representations during skill
acquisition, research to date has yet to consider the influence that
mental practice can have on this process. As an important means
to promote motor skill acquisition, mental practice has received a
great deal of attention in the last 50 years within cognitive sport
psychology. Mental practice in the sense of motor imagery
rehearsal refers to the act of repeatedly simulating (i.e., imagining)
a motor action in one’s mind without actually executing it at the
same time [25–28]. Unlike perception, imagery can be understood
as the creation or re-creation of real-world experiences in the
absence of the actual sensory stimuli [29–31]. Accordingly, in
contrast to actual or physical practice, which implies overtly
rehearsing a motor action, mental practice in the sense of motor
imagery rehearsal refers to the covert rehearsal of a motor action
by way of imagery.
Up to now, mental practice has proven to be an effective tool,
both to improve performance and to promote learning [32–36].
Meta-analyses studying the effectiveness of mental practice have
reported small to moderate effect sizes (i.e., d= .48 to d= .68),
suggesting that mental practice, although not as effective as
physical practice, significantly influences performance compared
to no practice. While, to date, no meta-analysis exists that has
thoroughly examined the effectiveness of a combination of
physical and mental practice, findings from various studies support
the superiority of such a combined type of practice on
performance [37–39]. From this and other research, mental
practice can be considered as an effective means to improve
performance and to promote learning. Specifically, comparing the
effectiveness of each practice type (i.e., combined practice (CP) –
physical practice (PP) – mental practice (MP) – no practice (NP)),
combined practice has been shown to be most effective, followed
by physical practice, while mental practice is less effective than its
physical counterpart, but more effective than no practice (i.e.,
CP.PP.MP.NP).
Researchers have suggested a variety of possible explanations
for the underlying mechanisms of mental practice [31,35]. Two
early theories offer two distinct perspectives, one focusing on more
peripheral processes (i.e., psychoneuromuscular theory) [40], and
one focusing on more central mechanisms (i.e., symbolic learning
theory) [41]. The psychoneuromuscular theory [40] is centered
around the activation of muscles during imagery. According to this
theory, mental practice is thought to facilitate the performance
and the learning of a movement such that it causes a similar
activation pattern of muscles as during movement execution,
which in turn aids subsequent movement execution. In contrast to
this more peripheral motor explanation, the symbolic learning
theory [41], representing a cognitive explanation, proposes that
the sequence of a movement is coded through symbols.
Accordingly, mental practice is thought to facilitate performing a
movement sequence through the repetition of symbolic compo-
nents of the movement sequence resulting in a better symbolic
representation.
More recently, the increasing interest in and findings from
neurophysiological research have led to an explanation for the
effects of mental practice which is known as the principle of
functional equivalence [27,28,42,43]. This principle focuses on
central mechanisms as well, and as such proposes that the
simulation of a movement (i.e., motor imagery) and the execution
of a movement are functionally equivalent. Thus, as stated by the
functional equivalence principle, mental practice to some extent
involves the same underlying structures and covert processes as
physical practice. Specifically, during motor imagery, the mental
representation of a motor action is activated in order to enable the
imager to imagine the movement, and it is stabilized as a result of
repeatedly imagining the movement. In this sense, mental practice
is thought to help improve performance and learning in a
functionally equivalent way as physical practice does. Up to now,
findings from neurophysiological research mainly support the
functional equivalence between the simulation and the execution
of an action [27,44–46]. Moreover, neurophysiological studies
have shown that both mental and physical practice lead to
significant changes in neural networks during skill acquisition [47–
51]. However, although neurophysiological studies elicit changes
in brain activation following mental practice, it is not clear, what
these changes stand for on a cognitive representational level. Such
changes in neurophysiological variables point to the idea that
functional changes on a cognitive level (i.e., concept formation in
one’s mental representation) may take place during mental
practice.
Taken together, while the acquisition of a complex motor skill
by way of physical practice has been shown to be accompanied by
the formation of representation structures in long-term memory, it
is currently unclear how mental practice affects this representation
formation process. Analogous to changes in brain activation on a
neural level, mental practice may lead to functional adaptations in
mental representation on a cognitive level. That is, we expect
mental practice to add to the development of representation
structures. Moreover, examining the effect of mental practice on
both the overt level of performance and the covert level of mental
Mental Representation and Mental Practice
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representations in novices might help to gain more detailed
understanding of the covert processes that do or do not lead to
performance improvements and learning in early skill acquisition.
To date, research examining how mental practice affects both
overt motor performance and covert mental representation is
lacking. Hence, with the present study, recreating the typical four
groups mental practice design [34,52], we aim at bridging this gap
by examining the effects of mental practice on both the
performance level and the mental representation level. In short,
we examined how physical practice, mental practice, and a
combination of both affect the performance and the development
of one’s mental representation of a golf putting task. Based on
previous findings, it was predicted that putting performance would
change according to type of practice such that combined practice
would be superior to physical practice, which in turn would be
superior to mental practice (i.e., CP.PP.MP.NP). Further-
more, it was predicted that, along with performance improve-
ments, changes to the underlying mental representation would be
evident as a consequence of skill acquisition. Specifically, it was
predicted that novices’ unstructured mental representation would
turn into a more structured representation with practice. More
importantly however, we were interested in what impact mental
practice would have on mental representation development, and
whether this related to performance.
Methods
Participants
Fifty-two students participated in the present study. All
participants were novice golfers with no prior experience in golf.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four groups:
mental practice group (n=13, mean age = 23.15, SD=2.28, 8
female), physical practice group (n=13, mean age = 24.54,
SD=3.64, 9 female), mental-physical combined practice group
(n=13, mean age = 23.69, SD=2.93, 9 female) and no practice
group (n=13, mean age = 27.31, SD=5.53, 8 female). The
experimental procedure and written consent form for this study
were approved by the ethics committee at Bielefeld University,
and adhered to the ethical standards of the sixth revision of the
Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave their informed
written consent to participate in the study.
Tasks and Measures
Performance. A standard putter and a standard golf ball
were used in the present study. Golf putts were performed on an
artificial indoor putting green (size: 467 m). Participants per-
formed putts to a target three meters away from the starting point.
Specifically, participants were instructed to putt a golf ball as
accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was supposed
to stop. The target was marked by a circle 10.8 cm (4.25 in) in
diameter in accordance with the size of a regular golf hole. The
outcome of each golf putt was recorded by capturing the final ball
position after each putt with a motion capture system. Specifically,
6 T10 CCD cameras captured and tracked the golf ball rolling and
stopping, with a spatial resolution of approximately 0.25 mm and
a temporal resolution of 200 Hz.
Mental representation structure. In order to assess mental
representation structure, we employed structural dimensional
analysis of mental representation (SDA-M). This method provides
psychometric data on the structure and dimension of mental
representations of complex movements in long-term memory.
More specifically, the SDA-M proceeds in four steps: (1) a split
procedure delivering a distance scaling between the BACs of a
suitably predetermined set, (2) a hierarchical cluster analysis used
to outline the structure of the given set of BACs, (3) a factor
analysis revealing the dimensions in this structured set of BACs,
and (4) an analysis of invariance within- and between-groups in
order to compare different cluster solutions [17]. More specifically,
in order to determine distances between BACs in memory, mental
representation structure was assessed by way of a splitting task, first
step of the SDA-M described above. The splitting task operates as
follows: one BAC of the putt is permanently displayed on a
computer screen (i.e., the anchor concept), while the rest of the
concepts are presented one after another in randomized order.
Participants are instructed to indicate whether a given BAC is
related to the anchor concept or not during movement execution.
As soon as a list of BACs is finished, another BAC takes the anchor
position and the procedure continues. The splitting task is
completed after each BAC has been compared to the remaining
BACs (n-1).
In order to examine the underlying representation structure of
the putt, the BACs of the movement have been adopted from
Frank et al. [23]. Accordingly, the following 16 BACs for the putt
were used in the present study: (1) shoulders parallel to target line,
(2) align club face square to target line, (3) grip check, (4) look to
the hole, (5) rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep arms-
shoulder triangle, (7) smooth transition, (8) rotate shoulders
towards the ball, (9) accelerate club, (10) impact with the ball,
(11) club face square to target line at impact, (12) follow-through,
(13) rotate shoulders through the ball, (14) decelerate club, (15)
direct clubhead to planned position, (16) look to the outcome.
Each of these 16 BACs of the putt can be designated to one
movement phase: preparation (BAC 1–4), backswing (BAC 5–7),
forward swing (BAC 8–9), impact (10–13) and attenuation (BAC
14–16).
Imagery ability. Visual and kinesthetic imagery ability was
measured using the revised version of the Movement Imagery
Questionnaire (MIQ-R) [53]. Accordingly, participants were asked
to perform, imagine and finally rate their imagery experience of a
series of movements. More specifically, after having performed a
given movement, participants were instructed to either ‘‘see’’ or
‘‘feel’’ the movement without actually performing it. Next, they
were asked to rate the ease or difficulty of imagining the movement
on a 7-point Likert scale. This procedure was repeated for 4
different movements, and for both visual and kinesthetic imagery,
resulting in 8 items.
Manipulation check. For the two groups involving mental
practice in their practice regime, as suggested by Goginsky and
Collins [54], a post-experimental questionnaire was administered
following each practice session in order to investigate whether
participants performed the imagery as instructed. Specifically,
participants of the mental practice groups were asked to describe
the content of their imagery in detail. In addition, they had to
indicate on 7-point Likert scales (1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy), how
easy it was for them to follow the instructions in general, as well as
how easy it was to ‘‘see’’ and how easy it was to ‘‘feel’’ the
movement in particular. Also, participants were asked how often
they used an external perspective and how often they used an
internal perspective (7-point Likert scales; 1 = never, 7 = always)
during their imagery. Furthermore, they were asked whether they
had experienced any problems, and whether they had any
previous experience with imagery.
Procedure
The present study consisted of a pre-test, an acquisition phase
on three consecutive days, followed by a post-test and a retention
test 72 hours later (see Table 1).
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Pre-test. On the first day, each participant signed informed
consent forms. In order to become familiar with the movement,
each participant watched a video of a skilled golfer performing the
putting task. An introduction to the splitting task by the
experimenter followed (for details on the SDA-M, see Tasks and
Measures section). Before completing the splitting task, each
participant was presented a randomized list of the 16 BACs of the
putt. In order to ensure comprehension of the concepts, the
experimenter explained the meaning of each of the 16 BACs to the
participant. Next, the participants read the instructions on how to
complete the splitting task. Specifically, participants were asked to
decide whether the presented BACs are related to one another or
not during movement execution. Following, the participants
completed the splitting task. This procedure served to determine
their starting mental representation structure of the putt. In order
to assess their starting performance level, each participant then
performed three blocks of 20 putts each. They were instructed to
putt a golf ball as accurately as possible to the target, on which the
ball was supposed to stop. As a measure of imagery ability, each
participant completed the MIQ-R.
Practice phase. The next three days, participants of each
practice group performed three blocks of twenty putts each (either
physically or mentally or a combination of both), while partici-
pants of the control group did not practice the putt at all.
Physical practice (PP) group. Physical practice consisted of three
blocks of 20 actual putts on each day of the practice phase.
Specifically, participants were instructed to putt as accurately as
possible to the target, on which the ball was supposed to stop. No
additional information (e.g., technical feedback) was given. The
visible outcome of the putt (i.e., knowledge of result) was the only
feedback available for the participants.
Mental practice (MP) group. Mental practice on each practice day
was comprised of specific motor imagery (i.e., putting imagery).
Participants in this group did not physically execute the putt
during practice. The motor imagery consisted of three blocks of 20
imagined putts each with a short break between the blocks. More
specifically, each participant was asked to take the starting position
as if they were going to actually putt. That is, participants stood
upright on the green with the putter in their hands and their eyes
closed. Next, the imagery script was read out loud to each
participant, both at the beginning and before each block.
Predefined by the script, participants were asked to imagine both
the putting movement as well as the ball rolling toward the target
and stopping on the target (for more details, see imagery scripts
[scripts are available from the corresponding author upon
request]). In order to control for as many aspects during imagery
as possible and to optimize the efficacy of the imagery
intervention, participants were further told to imagine from an
internal perspective (i.e., imagery perspective), to incorporate all
the senses in their imagery (i.e., imagery modality), and to try and
imagine as clear and as vivid as possible (i.e., imagery vividness)
[55]. After the script was read, participants imagined repeatedly
the putting movement on their own. In order to enable the
experimenter to control for the intended number of putts,
participants were asked to indicate when having finished one putt
in their imagery by slightly raising their index finger. Following
imagery, participants of the mental practice group filled out a post-
experimental questionnaire.
Combined practice (mental and physical practice; CP) group. The
combined practice consisted of three blocks of twenty putts on
each day of the practice phase, with each block consisting of 10
imagined followed by 10 actual putts (for specific instructions for
each of the two types of practice, see both the physical practice
group and mental practice group descriptions).
No practice (control; NP) group. The control group neither
imagined nor executed the putting movement during the practice
phase. Instead, participants in the control group were asked to
read about golf in general in ‘‘Dream on: one hack golfer’s
challenge to break par in a year’’ [56]. The reading lasted for
twenty minutes each day, which is approximately the time needed
to imagine three blocks of 20 putts.
Post- and retention-test. In order to determine their final
mental representation structures of the putting movement, all
participants completed the splitting task again, one day after
acquisition phase as well as after a retention interval of three days.
In addition, each participant performed three blocks of 20 putts
once more to assess their final outcome performance for post- and
retention-test.
Data Analysis
Mental representation structure. The structure of mental
representations was assessed by way of cluster analysis resulting in
mean group dendrograms [17]. For all cluster analyses conducted,
an alpha-level of a= .05 was chosen, resulting in a critical value
dcrit = 3.41. BACs linked above this critical value were considered
irrelevant. That is, links between concepts above this value were
considered not related, while concepts linked below this value were
considered related and thus resulted in a cluster. In order to
Table 1. Design of the study including three test days and an acquisition phase.
Pre-test Acquisition Post-test Retention-test
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 8
Combined practice group (n=13) SDA-M - SDA-M SDA-M
Putting task Putting practice (executed and imagined putts) Putting task Putting task
Physical practice group (n=13) SDA-M - SDA-M SDA-M
Putting task Putting practice (executed putts only) Putting task Putting task
Mental practice group (n= 13) SDA-M - SDA-M SDA-M
Putting task Putting practice (imagined putts only) Putting task Putting task
Control group (n=13) SDA-M - SDA-M SDA-M
Putting task No putting practice (reading) Putting task Putting task
Note: SDA-M: structural dimensional analysis of mental representation; putting task on test days: 3620 putts; putting practice during acquisition phase: 3620 (imagined
or/and executed) putts per day (practice groups) or 20 min of reading per day (control group).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095175.t001
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compare differences between cluster solutions, analyses of
invariance were conducted [17,57,58]. Accordingly, cluster
solutions are variant (i.e., differ), for l,0.68, while cluster
solutions are invariant (i.e., do not differ) for l$0.68. Moreover,
the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) [59,60] was used to further
investigate the degree of similarity between mean group dendro-
grams and a reference dendrogram reflecting the different
movement phases. The Adjusted Rand Index is an index of
similarity, ranging on a scale from 21 to 1. As the value ‘‘21’’
denotes that cluster solutions are different and the value ‘‘1’’
denotes that two cluster solutions are the same, indices between
‘‘21’’ and ‘‘1’’ mark the degree of similarity between two cluster
solutions.
Performance. Putting performance was measured by two
outcome variables (i.e., accuracy and consistency) for each time of
measurement. Specifically, accuracy and consistency were calcu-
lated using two-dimensional error scores based on the x and y
coordinates of each putt with the center of the target being the
origin of the axes [61]. Accuracy was measured by mean radial
error (MRE), defined as a subject’s average distance each putt
came to the center of the target in centimeters. Consistency was
measured by bivariate variable error (BVE), analogous to variable
error in one-dimensional analyses, and defined as the square root
of a subject’s k shots’ mean squared distance from their centroids
in centimeters. A subject’s centroid is a positionally typical shot
whose coordinates are given by the average x and average y value
of a subject’s shots in centimeters. Learning over time was
analyzed by way of two separate one-way MANCOVAs on both
the post-test scores and the retention-test scores of the two
dependent variables MRE and BVE. Specifically, a one-way
MANCOVA on post-test scores with group as a between-subjects
factor and pre-test scores as a covariate was conducted in order to
examine whether the groups differed in their performance after
acquisition phase as a result of practice condition, thereby
controlling for potential differences in their pre-test performance.
Regarding retention, a one-way MANCOVA on retention-test
scores with group as a between-subjects factor and pre-test scores
as a covariate was performed in order to examine whether the
groups differed in their level of performance after a three day
period of no practice, while controlling for the level of
performance at baseline. Next, separate one-way ANCOVAs
were conducted for each of the dependent variables. As directional
effects had been specified a priori (CP.PP.MP.NP), one-tailed
pairwise comparisons based on estimated marginal means served
as tests of significance. A Holm-Bonferroni correction was
employed in order to account for the inflation of type I errors
[62]. Cohen’s d was used as an estimate of effect size [63].
Imagery ability. In order to compare imagery ability
between groups, three separate one-way ANOVAs on overall
imagery ability (i.e., both scales together) as well as on visual and
kinesthetic imagery ability were conducted.
Results
Imagery Ability
Overall, participants reported acceptable visual imagery ability
(M=21.46, SD=3.84.; 5.37 per item) as well as acceptable
kinesthetic imagery ability (M=19.77, SD=4.47.; 4.94 per item).
Specifically, on average participants scored approximately 5 on
both scales (i.e., somewhat easy to see/feel), which is considered as
sufficient imagery ability for subsequent mental practice sessions
[64,65]. In addition, one-way ANOVAs on imagery ability
revealed no main effect of group, neither for overall imagery
ability, F(3,48) = .273, p= .845, gp
2 = .017, nor for visual imagery
ability, F(3,48) = .170, p= .916, gp
2 = .011, or kinesthetic imagery
ability, F(3,48) = .198, p= .897, gp
2 = .012, indicating that imagery
ability was similar for each of the four groups.
Manipulation Check
In order to ensure that participants of the mental and mental-
physical combined practice group had performed the imagery as
instructed, participants’ manipulation check responses were
analyzed. None of the participants had prior imagery experience.
In addition, none of the participants reported any problems during
imagery sessions. Relating to the content of imagery, each
participant mentioned the putting movement as well as the ball
rolling in their descriptions of imagery content. Furthermore, for
imagery perspective, mean scores during practice phase were 6.40,
very often (SD=0.53) for internal perspective and 1.80, almost never
(SD=0.85) for external perspective, indicating that participants of
the mental practice and the mental-physical combined practice
group had adopted an internal perspective during imagery. For
ease of visual and kinesthetic imagery, participants scored an
average of 4.37, neither easy nor difficult (SD=1.40) for visual imagery
and 4.67, somewhat easy to feel (SD=1.49) for kinesthetic imagery,
meaning that they had been able to ‘‘see’’ and to ‘‘feel’’ the
movement while imagining. For instructions in general, mean
scores were 4.73, somewhat easy (SD=1.29), indicating that
participants had been able to follow the instructions during
imagery. Thus, participants had been able to perform the imagery
as instructed, which was considered a prerequisite for subsequent
data analyses.
Mental Representation Structure
While cluster analysis revealed little to no clustering in the mean
group dendrograms of each group for pre-test, each practice
group’s dendrograms revealed changes over time (see Figures 1–3).
Mental practice group. While no distinct structure existed
for the mental practice group at pre-test, a more elaborate mental
representation structure was evident after acquisition phase (see
Figure 1). More specifically, four functional clusters were observed
in the mental practice group’s mean dendrogram at post-test,
pertaining to three phases of the putt: preparation (i.e., BAC 2, 3),
forward swing and impact (i.e., BAC 8, 9 as well as BAC 10, 11,
13), and attenuation (i.e., BAC 14, 16). The same was true for
retention-test with some minor differences for impact phase (i.e.,
two separate clusters: BAC 10, 11 as well as 12, 13). Thus, for the
mental practice group, an increase in the number of functional
clusters was apparent in their mental representation structure over
the course of the study. Statistical analyses of invariance confirmed
the above presented descriptive results, revealing significant
differences in representation structure between pre- and post-test,
pre- and retention-test, as well as between post- and retention-test
(l#0.68). What is more, increasing adjusted rand indices from
pre-test (ARI= 0.17) to post-test (ARI= 0.44) and to retention-test
(ARI= 0.44) indicated that, over the course of mental practice, the
mean dendrograms of the mental practice group became more
similar to the reference dendrogram (for an overview of ARIs, see
Table 2). Hence, the changes in representation structure of the
mental practice group are functional, and reflect a development
towards an optimal structure.
Combined practice group. Similar to the mental practice
group, the mental representation structure of the combined
practice group was more elaborate after acquisition phase (see
Figure 2). Again, four functional clusters were evident in the
combined practice group’s mean dendrogram at post-test,
pertaining to preparation (i.e., BAC 2, 3), forward swing and
impact phase (i.e., BAC 8, 9 as well as BAC 10, 11), and
Mental Representation and Mental Practice
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attenuation (i.e., BAC 14, 16). For retention-test, the mean group
dendrogram revealed basically the same structure with some
minor differences in the preparation (i.e., comprised of one
additional concept: BAC 2, 3, 4) and the forward swing and
impact phase (i.e., BAC 8, 9 and BAC 10, 11, 13). Hence, for the
combined practice group, the number of functional clusters
increased as well over the course of the study. Statistical analyses
of invariance indicated significant differences in representation
structure between pre- and post-test, pre- and retention-test, as
well as between post- and retention-test (l#0.68). When being
compared to the reference structure, increasing adjusted rand
indices from pre-test (ARI= 0.09) to post-test (ARI= 0.31) and
retention-test (ARI= 0.50) were evident, confirming that the
mental representation structure of the combined practice group
developed towards the reference structure over the course of the
study.
Physical practice group. In contrast to the mental and the
mental-physical combined practice groups, only minor changes in
the mental representation structure of the putt were evident for the
physical practice group (see Figure 3). Specifically, while the mean
group dendrogram of the practice group revealed no cluster at
pre-test, the dendrograms revealed one cluster for post-test (i.e.,
Figure 1. Mean group dendrograms of the mental practice
group (n=13) for the golf putt. The dendrograms refer to (a) pre-
test, (b) post-test and (c) retention-test. The numbers on the x-axis
relate to the BAC number, the numbers on the y-axis display Euclidean
distances. The lower the link between related BACs, the lower is the
Euclidean distance. The horizontal dotted line marks dcrit for a given a-
level (dcrit = 3.41; a= .05): links between BACs above this line are
considered not related; horizontal grey lines on the bottom mark
clusters. BACs: (1) shoulders parallel to target line, (2) align club face
square to target line, (3) grip check, (4) look to the hole, (5) rotate
shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep arms-shoulder triangle, (7)
smooth transition, (8) rotate shoulders towards the ball, (9) accelerate
club, (10) impact with the ball, (11) club face square to target line at
impact, (12) follow-through, (13) rotate shoulders through the ball, (14)
decelerate club, (15) direct clubhead to planned position, and (16) look
to the outcome.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095175.g001
Figure 2. Mean group dendrograms of the combined practice
group (n=13) for the golf putt. The dendrograms refer to (a) pre-
test, (b) post-test and (c) retention-test (a= 0.05; dkrit=3.41).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095175.g002
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attenuation: BAC 14, 16). For retention-test, one meaningful
cluster pertaining to the impact phase (i.e., BAC 10, 11, 13) was
evident. Statistical analyses of invariance revealed significant
differences between pre- and post-test, pre- and retention-test, as
well as between post- and retention-test (l#0.68). Interestingly,
the practice group’s structure revealed only small changes toward
the reference structure, with ARI increasing from pre-test
(ARI= 0.00) to post-test (ARI= 0.09), and to retention-test
(ARI= 0.24).
Control group. For the control group, changes in mental
representation structure were small (Figure 4). Specifically, while
there were no clusters evident at pre-test, the control group’s
dendrogram revealed one cluster pertaining to aspects of
attenuation of the putting stroke (i.e., BAC 14, 16) at post-test.
After the retention interval, the mean dendrogram additionally
revealed a second cluster reflecting parts of the preparation (i.e.,
BAC 2, 3). Statistical analyses of invariance indicated significant
differences in representation structure between pre- and post-test,
between pre- and retention-test, as well as between post- and
retention-test (l#0.68). Furthermore, in comparison to the
reference structure, the control group’s structure showed only a
slight trend towards that structure over time, with ARI increasing
from pre-test (ARI= 0.00), to post-test (ARI= 0.08), and to
retention-test (ARI= 0.17).
Thus, each group’s mental representation changed over the
course of practice. Moreover, each group’s structure developed to
some extent in direction of the reference structure. More
importantly, whereas the control and the physical practice groups’
mental representations elicited only minor changes over the course
of the study and showed only a small development towards the
reference structure, the representation structures of the mental and
the mental-physical combined practice group changed more, and
approached more so an optimal representation.
Outcome Performance
For the four groups, putting performance from pre-, to post-
and to retention-test is displayed in Figures 5 and 6. As seen in
Figure 5 and 6, the physical and the mental-physical combined
practice groups performed more accurately and consistently after
the acquisition phase, followed by the mental practice group,
whereas the control group performed worst. After a three day
retention interval, however, the mental-physical combined prac-
tice group performed with the greatest accuracy and consistency
followed by the physical and the mental practice groups, while the
control group again performed worst (cf. Figure 5 and 6).
Regarding the acquisition phase, a one-way MANCOVA on
post-test scores of MRE and BVE revealed a significant main
effect of group, Wilks’ Lambda= .750, F(6,90) = 2.326, p= .037,
Figure 3. Mean group dendrograms of the physical practice
group (n=13) for the golf putt. The dendrograms refer to (a) pre-
test, (b) post-test and (c) retention-test (a=0.05; dkrit=3.41).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095175.g003
Table 2. Degrees of change in adjusted rand indices over the course of the study.
Degree of change in adjusted rand indices
Pre-to post-test Pre-to-retention-test Post-to-retention-test
Combined practice 0.22 0.41 0.19
Mental practice 0.27 0.27 0.00
Physical practice 0.09 0.25 0.15
No practice 0.08 0.17 0.09
Note: The adjusted rand index serves as an index of similarity on a scale from 21 to 1. On this scale, the value ‘‘21’’ indicates that two cluster solutions (here: mean
group dendrograms and the reference) are different and the value ‘‘1’’ indicates that two cluster solutions are the same. Indices between these extremes rank similarity
between two cluster solutions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095175.t002
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gp
2 = .133, 1-b= .784. Subsequent one-way ANCOVAs revealed a
main effect of group for MRE, F(3,46) = 3.218, p= .031,
gp
2 = .173, 1-b= .704 as well as for BVE, F(3,46) = 3.416,
p= .025, gp
2 = .182, 1-b= .733. For MRE, pairwise comparisons
incorporating a Holm-Bonferroni correction revealed no signifi-
cant differences among the groups. For BVE, pairwise compar-
isons revealed that the combined practice group performed with
more consistency compared to both the mental practice group
(p= .005; acrit = .008) and the control group (p= .009; acrit = .010)
post practice. The physical practice group, however, did not
perform significantly different compared to either the mental
practice group (p= .032; acrit = .013), or the control group
(p= .052; acrit = .017). Regarding retention, a one-way MAN-
COVA on retention-test scores of MRE and BVE revealed no
significant main effect of group, Wilks’ Lambda= .849,
F(6,90) = 1.279, p= .275, gp
2 = .079, 1-b= .479.
Taken together, although the groups did not show differences in
learning in terms of putting accuracy, clear differences were
observed in terms of putting consistency such that the combined
practice led to more consistent putting compared to both mental
practice only and no practice. However, these differences between
groups did not persist over the three day retention interval.
Discussion
In the present study, we investigated the effect of three different
types of practice (mental practice, physical practice and their
combination) in comparison to a no practice control group on
both the performance and the mental representation structure of a
complex movement during early skill acquisition. Overall, findings
clearly denote order formation of basic action concepts of the putt
together with improvements in putting performance. Interestingly,
both types of practice involving imagery rehearsal (i.e., mental
practice and combined practice) led to more structured and more
elaborate representations, compared to physical practice and no
practice.
While the mental representation structure of the control group
and the physical practice group changed only marginally over
time, the representation structure of the mental practice and the
combined practice group elicited distinct changes over practice.
Both after acquisition and after a retention interval of three days,
the dendrograms of the mental practice as well as the combined
practice group revealed four meaningful cluster, pertaining to
functional aspects of the movement, and assignable to three
movement phases in a golf putt (i.e., preparation, forward swing
and impact, attenuation). Furthermore, changes in representation
structures reflected a development towards a reference structure as
indicated by increases in adjusted rand indices from pre-, to post-,
and to retention-test. In contrast, the dendrograms of the control
and the physical practice group revealed only minor changes over
time. While for both groups one cluster relating to attenuation was
evident after acquisition, the two dendrograms differed after a
retention interval of three days. Specifically, the control groups
mean dendrogram reflected two clusters pertaining to the
beginning and the end of the movement (i.e., preparation and
attenuation), whereas the physical practice group’s dendrogram
consisted of a cluster pertaining to the main phase of the
movement (i.e., forward swing and impact). However, the small
increases in adjusted rand indices from pre-, to post-, and to
retention-test reflect only minimal development towards the
reference representation. Thus, the mental and mental-physical
combined practice led to more elaborate representation structures,
more closely resembling an optimal representation, compared to
the physical and no practice.
The results of the present study extend research on mental
representations of complex action. Early research in this field,
relating mental representation structure and skill level, has shown
that high skill-level is associated with high order formation, and
that low skill-level is associated with low order formation in long-
term memory [15]. Recently, Frank et al. [23] demonstrated that
practice leads to functional adaptations in one’s mental represen-
tation of a complex action. Employing a similar design, the present
study both replicates and extends findings reported by Frank et al.
[23]. Similar to the study of Frank et al. [23], mental
representation structure were found to develop over the course
of practice. More importantly, however, the present study extends
findings obtained by Frank et al. [23] by showing that mental
practice adds to the adaptation process leading to even more
elaborate mental representations compared to physical practice
alone. Specifically, mental practice as well as combined mental-
Figure 4. Mean group dendrograms of the control group
(n=13) for the golf putt. The dendrograms refer to (a) pre-test, (b)
post-test and (c) retention-test (a=0.05; dkrit=3.41).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095175.g004
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physical practice led to more structured representations than
physical practice only and no practice. More specifically, mental
representations of the putt were more similar to the reference
structure for the practice groups involving mental practice of the
skill than for the groups involving either physical practice only or
no practice of the skill. From this, mental practice seems to lead to
more developed mental representations than physical practice
during early skill acquisition.
Interestingly, the mental representations of the four groups
revealed slightly different patterns prior to the acquisition phase
(see Figures 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a). To what extent this might influence the
rate of representation development is unclear. To date, no
research has examined whether the rate of development is
influenced by the degree of structure in one’s initial mental
representation. In other words, it is conceivable that more or less
structured initial representations may relate to the speed at which
the structures change over the course of a practice interval.
Consequently, future research is needed to clarify this point and
help shed light on the learning process.
With respect to outcome performance, the combined practice
led to more consistent putting performance over the course of
learning compared to both mental practice only and no practice in
the present study. This is in line with findings from previous
research suggesting that a combination of physical and mental
practice is most effective for the learning of a new motor skill [37].
While the degree to which the groups learned during skill
acquisition was influenced by practice type in the present study,
these differences did not persist over the course of three days of no
practice. Similar to other studies investigating the effect of mental
practice on the retention of a motor skill [66], the groups did not
differ in their retention performance of the acquired putting skill
over the course of the retention interval.
While differences in putting consistency according to practice
type were obvious after acquisition phase, no differences were
found in putting accuracy in the present study. That is,
participants differed in how consistent their putting was, but not
in how accurate each putt came to the target. Moreover, physical
practice did not significantly differ from either mental or no
practice, neither in terms of accuracy nor in terms of consistency.
Two main reasons may have caused the lack of differences during
acquisition phase. First, as reflected by the minor changes in
mental representation structure, participants in the control group
seem to have learned from test trials. Thus, increases in putting
performance for the control group may be due to repeatedly
executing the putt during test-days. Second, the lack of differences
may also be due to the relative short length of the study.
Specifically, too few practice sessions during acquisition phase may
have resulted in the lack of clear differences between the groups.
This may also be a reason for the finding that the four groups did
not differ in their ability to retain their level of putting skill over
three days of no practice. It is likely that larger differences would
emerge over a greater length of practice. Future studies, therefore,
should consider utilizing fewer trials during test days and more
practice sessions during the acquisition phase to prevent this
possible confound.
Whereas the groups involving physical practice (i.e., PP+CP)
elicited the best putting performance after practice, those groups
practicing mentally (i.e., MP+CP) revealed more elaborate
representation structures after practice compared to groups who
did not practice mentally. These differences pertain to distinct
Figure 5. Putting accuracy. Mean radial error (i.e., accuracy) in cm from pre-test to post- and retention-test. The different lines relate to the
different groups. Error bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095175.g005
Mental Representation and Mental Practice
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 April 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 4 | e95175
mechanisms underlying mental practice and physical practice. In
other words, each of the groups may have learned in different
ways. Learning induced by mental practice may primarily operate
through and find expression on the cognitive level, whereas
learning via physical practice may primarily operate through and
find expression on the motor output level. In this light, it seems
plausible that the two groups involving mental practice elicited
more developed mental representations than the groups not
practicing mentally. To explain, mental practice can be considered
an ‘‘offline’’ process requiring primarily the re-creation of an
experience from memory while covertly imagining a movement
(cf. distinction between online task performance (i.e., real-time skill
execution) and offline task performance (i.e., no real-time skill
execution, no overt act) [67]). As there is no online information
available during imagery, this process is thought to rely on
memorial information only [30]. Thus, we propose that mental
practice may work via the structuring of memorial information
(i.e., the structuring of mental representation), and as such causes
adaptation processes within the motor system. In contrast, physical
practice, being an online process, requires the online integration of
perceptual feedback during overt movement execution, and
therefore does not primarily rely on the offline reconstruction of
an experience from memory. Accordingly, physical practice
applies via the integration of sensory information and as such
promotes adaptation processes in this manner. Taken together, we
propose that, while physical practice causes feedback-induced
online adaptation, mental practice may cause memory-induced
offline adaptation. In this regard, the memory-induced offline
adaptation may have led to a cognitive structuring advantage in
the sense of more structured memorial information on the
movement (i.e., more developed mental representations of the
putt) in the two groups that involved mental practice.
It seems quite interesting that, whereas mental and mental-
physical combined practice led to more elaborate representation
structures compared to physical and no practice, this difference
was not fully expressed on the performance level in the present
study. Specifically, although the findings of the present study point
to the idea that mental practice in early skill acquisition may help
to structure mental representation more than physical practice,
this cognitive structuring advantage itself does not seem to transfer
one-to-one to the motor output level. Being an ‘‘offline’’ process,
this cognitive structuring itself seems to not immediately lead to
better motor performance. It might be the case that this cognitive
advantage does not turn into a performance advantage, unless
online feedback is available and is being integrated. Accordingly,
although the mental-physical combined practice group performed
equally to physical practice in the present study, a closer look at
the data points to the possibility that combined practice may be
even superior to physical practice after a greater amount of
practice. In fact, the combination of mental and physical practice
has been suggested to be most effective in improving performance
[37]. In this sense, one might speculate that the controllability of
the motor system can best be achieved via both memory-induced
offline adaptation (i.e., mental practice) and feedback-induced
online adaptation (i.e., physical practice). Accordingly, future
research might focus on long-term and transfer effects of mental
and physical practice on both the performance and the
representation of a motor skill.
What’s more, the findings of the present study fit well into the
body of research on the cognitive-motor hypothesis [68-71], and
even extend it as we will elaborate in the following. The cognitive-
Figure 6. Putting consistency. Bivariate variable error (i.e., consistency) in cm from pre-test to post- and retention-test. The different lines relate to
the different groups. Error bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095175.g006
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motor hypothesis states that mental practice is more effective in
cognitive tasks compared to motor tasks. That is, while mental
practice is suggested to be effective both for cognitive and motor
tasks, this hypothesis differentiates such that cognitive tasks are
suggested to benefit even more from mental practice compared to
motor tasks. Thus, the more cognitive a task is, the more it might
benefit from mental practice. Up to now, findings largely support
this hypothesis: although mental practice has been found to be
effective in motor tasks [72], effect sizes reported in the meta-
analysis conducted by Driskell et al. [32] were greater for cognitive
tasks (d= .69) than for motor tasks (d= .34). To explain, the typical
design of these studies examining the cognitive-motor hypotheses
consists of two groups practicing mentally, each practicing a
different task: one group practicing a cognitive task, and one group
practicing a motor task. That is, two different tasks (i.e., one motor
and one cognitive task) are employed in order to examine the
influence of mental practice on resulting performance [69,70].
However, to our knowledge, no study has been conducted so far
that takes into account both the cognitive and the motor level
within one task. Thus, no statements can be made so far whether
mental practice affects more the cognitive compared to the motor
level within a motor task. In the present study, we employed one
task (i.e., golf putting) and examined the effect of mental practice
on two different variables, one ‘‘cognitive’’ variable (i.e., mental
representation structure) and one ‘‘motor’’ variable (i.e., putting
performance). Thus, we used a within-task design, taking into
account both the cognitive and the motor level of the golf putt. If
we related the research question of the present study back to the
cognitive-motor hypothesis, one would expect that mental practice
would affect the cognitive structures to a larger degree than the
motor output of a motor task. That is exactly what we found in the
present study.
It seems important to note that oftentimes in mental practice
studies, a potential lack of differences in performance according to
practice type results in conclusions such that mental practice is not
effective in novices. This is, of course, true with respect to
performance. However, these studies do not take into account
covert processes. Yet, according to learning theories, proposing
that first stages of learning are primarily cognitive in nature, one
might expect that changes evoked by mental practice (i.e., a
cognitive type of practice) primarily take place on the cognitive
level in early skill acquisition, and that these changes may not be
transferred one-to-one on to the motor level without additional
physical practice (i.e., a motor type of practice during which the
performer repeatedly receives actual perceptual feedback). Ac-
cordingly, one would expect mental practice to especially affect the
development of these cognitive processes. For the host of studies
reporting no differences according to practice type, this would not
necessarily mean that there were no differences between groups,
but perhaps that the variables that may elicit these differences had
not been measured. With the present study, we were able to show
that, although not obvious from overtly observable putting
performance, mental practice covertly helped to develop mental
representation structure in novices.
In sum, the results of the present study clearly demonstrate that
practice leads to functional adaptations in the representation
structure of complex action, and that mental practice supports this
adaptation, leading to even more elaborate representations. While
research in the field of mental practice has largely focused on
overtly observable performance effects during early skill acquisi-
tion, thereby mostly neglecting the investigation of covert cognitive
effects, we showed that repeatedly imagining a movement affects
the development of one’s underlying mental representation
structure. Building on these findings, it would be of interest to
learn more about the adaptation of mental representation
structure on the way to expertise. From a theoretical point of
view, future research might focus on the question how different
(mental) practice conditions (e.g., duration, scheduling, composi-
tion of practice) contribute to the development of mental
representation structure, and, even more importantly, what
conditions are most effective in contributing to the formation of
an expert structure. From an applied point of view, a valuable
future objective would be to examine whether practice and mental
practice tailored to the one’s current skill representation (i.e.,
individualized physical and mental practice) [73] is more effective
than standard type of practice not considering one’s cognitive
prerequisites. To conclude, during early phases of skill acquisition,
motor learning is associated with order formation of action-related
knowledge in long-term memory, and this order formation seems
to be promoted by mental practice.
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